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pounded if a jury, not a judge sitting alone, had rendered the conviction
in the original trial; or if the record, incomplete in its description of the
police interrogation, had specified police misconduct similar to that in
Dravecz and Cockrell. As the practical application of the adoptive admissions rule requires the defendant to elect between speech and silence
without full knowledge of the ramifications of each, the courts should be

extremely wary of admitting adoptive admissions in criminal cases.
M. CRAIG GARNER, JR.

CAPACITY TO SUE: THE DEVELOPING 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL RULE 17(b)
DOMICILE PRINCIPLE
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[t]he
capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile."'
Rule 17(b), on its face, is apparently applicable to suits brought by individuals based on state law as well as suits based on federal law. However,
when a state-incarcerated felon bases his suit on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 the
civil remedy provision of the Civil Rights Act,3 most federal courts faced
with the issue have held that the prisoner has capacity to sue, even though

his state has a statute barring all suits by incarcerated felons.4 This

'For the purposes of Rule 17(b) the word "domicile" has been said to mean the place
where a person has his true, fixed and permanent home, a test somewhat analogous to that
used for "citizenship" in measuring federal subject matter jurisdiction under the general
diversity statute 28 U.S.C. § 1332. C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1560 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT AND MILLER].
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
242 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88 (1970). Section 1983 was originally enacted as section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. Its passage represented the indignant
reaction of Congress to conditions in the southern states where the Ku Klux Klan and other
lawless elements were rendering life and property insecure. For a discussion of the abuses
which fostered passage of the act, see Justice Douglas' opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 171-87 (196 1). For an analysis of the legislative history and the evolution of the statute,
see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L.
REV. 277 (1965).
'Beyer v. Werner, 299 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F.
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judicially-created exception to the proposition in the first sentence of Rule
17(b) was examined and expanded by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent case, Almond v. Kent.'
Almond, a Virginia prisoner incarcerated under state process, brought
suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights
against Kent, Sheriff of Augusta County, the Augusta County Division
of the Virginia State Police, and several state troopers.' The district court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not sued by
committee in accordance with Virginia law 7 made applicable to the district court by Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules.8 On appeal, the Fourth
Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See also Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963). Contra, Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
At the present time, thirteen states have statutes which restrict the right of certain prisoners
to sue or be sued while incarcerated. Note 18-19 infra.
5459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
'Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Va. 1970). The plaintiff alleged 1) that the
state police unreasonably beat him with resulting physical injuries; 2) that his shoes were
taken from him at the Augusta County jail; 3) that he was placed in "isolation" and was
denied visits from his family; and 4) that the $50,000 bail set for him was excessive. Id. at
1226. Historically, the judiciary has been extremely reluctant to review the complaints of
convicts. Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A CritiqueofJudicialRefusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). However, in recent years, this "handsoff doctrine" has been largely discarded. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons:
A Manualfor Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 473-74 (1971).
7
The Virginia statutory provisions in question were VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-305 to 312.1
(Repl. vol. 1972). Section 53-305 states:
When a person is convicted of a felony and sentenced to confinement
in the penitentiary or to the State convict road force for one year or more
his estate, both real and personal, if any he has, shall, on motion of any
party interested, be committed by the circuit or corporation court of the
county or city in which his estate, or some part thereof is, to a person
selected by the court, who after giving bond before the court, in such
penalty as it may prescribe, shall have charge of the estate until the convict
is discharged from confinement.
Section 53-307 provides:
Such [person serving as] committee may sue and be sued in respect
to all claims or demands of every nature in favor of or against such
convict, and any other of the convict's estate, and he shall have the same
right of retaining for his own debt as an administrator would have. No
action or suit on any such claim or demand shall [otherwise] be instituted
by or against such convict after judgment of conviction, and while he is
incarcerated. All actions or suits to which he is a party at the time of his
conviction shall be prosecuted or defended, as the case may be, by such
committee after ten days' notice of the pendency thereof, which notice
shall be given by the clerk of the court in which the same are pending.
'Since Almond was apparently domiciled in Virginia prior to his conviction and remained in the state during imprisonment, the federal courts must look to Virginia law. Note
I supra.
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Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that to require the com-

mittee statute to be observed in suits under section 1983 would only serve
to delay the assertion of federal rights? The court also stated that the
delay involved in requiring a committee to be appointed could result in
the prisoner's remedy being completely foreclosed by operation of the

Virginia statute of limitations."0 In reaching its decision, the court relied

heavily on cases which have held that the personal rights accruing to the

prisoner under section 1983 superseded Rule 17(b)'s adoption of state law
if the state law totally barred prisoners' suits."
Capacity to Sue or be Sued

The legal concept of capacity to litigate involved in Almond is of
ancient origin.' Capacity may be defined as a party's personal right to
come into court." When public policy requires that an individual not be
allowed to sue or be sued, courts have held that the individual lacks the
proper capacity to participate in the judicial process."
For purposes of analysis, it is necessary to distinguish three types of
disqualification to litigate.

(1) Total Incapacity. This concept is usually employed to bar all suits
by persons whom the society finds to be unworthy possessors of legal
The trooper defendants also raised the defense of statute of limitations, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-24 (Repl. vol. 1957). Since there is no applicable federal limitations statute applicable
to a civil damage action under the federal civil rights statutes, the federal courts are to apply
the state statutes of limitation. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-24 (1914). Federal
courts generally have indicated that the applicable period of limitations in a section 1983
action is the one which state courts would apply if the action were brought in a state court
under state law. Swan v. Board of Higher Education, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963). The
district court in Ahnond held a one year period applicable and gave this as an additional
ground for dismissal. 321 F. Supp. at 1229. For a discussion of the myriad problems which
have arisen due to lack of a federal statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, see Note,
A Linitation on Actionsfor DeprivationofFederalRights, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 763 (1968).
'Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 203. Note 8 supra.
"459 F.2d at 203. The court also reversed the decision of the district court regarding
the applicability of the one year limitations period. The court held that because section 1983
creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color of state law, to the person
or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate or are guaranteed to the
person, Virginia's two year limitation period for personal injuries should apply to all 1983
damage suits. Id. at 204.
"Kennedy, Federal Civil Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate in FederalCourt,
43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 273 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KENNEDY].
"WRIGHT AND MILLER at § 1559.
"KENNEDY at 273-75. The policy factors are briefly discussed in F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 9.9 n.3 (1965).
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rights.' s The Roman system of law provides the classic historical example
since it generally denied legal status to those who were not citizens of
Rome." Although the trend in the law has been towards disappearance
of such total disabilities, 7 several states retain "civil death" statutes' s
which, in stripping prisoners under life sentence of civil status, prevent

them from bringing any action in court. 9
(2)

Suspended Capacity. Under this concept, an individual loses his

5
KENNEDY at 274.
"The Roman system recognized a series of partial capacities and resulting legal relations as a human person descended from categories of "citizen," "freeman" and "father"
to their polar statuses of "noncitizen," "slave" and "son." J. MUIRHEAD, LAW OF ROME
§ 29 at 121-26 (2d ed. 1899).
7
KENNEDY at 275.
"EAt common law, a person convicted of treason or another felony was subject to three
principal penalties: forfeiture of property to the king; corruption of blood, which incapacitated the convict from either transmitting property to his heirs or taking property from his
ancestors; and an extinction of civil rights, more or less complete, known as "civil death."
Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888); Comment, Convicts-Loss of Civil
Rights-Civil Death in California, 26 S. Cal. L. Rev. 425 (1953).
Civil death is a part of the English common law which has never been recognized in
the common law of the United States. Platner v. Sherwood, 6 John Ch. (N.Y.) 118 (1822).
However, at the present time, twelve states have statutes imposing the status of civil death
on those serving a life sentence: ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.080
(1970); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653(B) (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-311 (1947);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4721 (Repl. vol. 1969);
N.Y. Civ. RT. LAW § 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 66 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240(1) (1969); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-37 (1953). The trend is away from
the original concept of strict civil death, as it is generally no longer held that the prisoner
forfeits his property or loses his power to contract. What does remain of civil death,
however, includes the prevention of a prisoner from bringing an action in court. Avery v.
Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (18888); Lynch v. Quinlan, 65 Misc. 2d 236, 317
N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Note, State Liability to Innocent Prisonersin Prison Uprisings. 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 120 (1972).
19The constitutionality of these civil death statutes, while not often questioned, has been
upheld. E.g., Harrell v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 950, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Quick v.
Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922). But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibits a state from denying access to its courts to individuals seeking divorce
who are unable to pay court fees. The Court, however, limited its holding by stating:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right
that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed [by due process] so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any individual . . ..
401 U.S. at 382-83.
However, since the Supreme Court has never ruled on the civil death statutes, their constitutionality may be considered suspect in light of Boddie. The Court has already recognized
the prisoner's right of access to court to attack his criminal conviction. Ex parte Hull, 312
U.S. 546 (1944).
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right to go into court for a definite or indefinite period but regains the
right to bring actions at a later time. An example of this type of disability
would be the statutes of those states which, as an extension of the civil
death policy, prevent a prisoner serving less than a life sentence from

bringing suit during the period of incarceration."0 Generally, the statute
of limitations is tolled during the period of suspended capacity. 2' Another
example is the federal statute declaring a non-resident alien enemy to be

without capacity to file suit in any court of the United States for the
duration of a war.22
(3) Formal Incapacity. Under this concept, an individual, while not
prevented from bringing suit, may litigate only through a representative

regulated by fiduciary obligations. The policy of formal incapacity is
generally employed to prevent individuals from representing themselves
in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process or to foster the
efficient administration of the judicial system.2? Thus, minors and incompetents are not allowed to bring suit except through representatives,2 4
as they are presumed to be unable to participate adequately in the adver-

sary process.? The opposing litigant, by raising objections to qualifications of a minor or incompetent, represents society's interest in demand2
ing proper representation of the ward's interest.
The Virginia statute involved in Almond, although directed at prisoners like the civil death statutes, does not prevent prisoners from seeking
a judicial remedy for alleged wrongs. Since the only qualification on the
right to litigate is the appointment of a representative to bring or defend

suits,21 the Virginia statute may be classified as a formal incapacity statute.
"0Nine states retain such statutes: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653(A) (1956); CAL.
§ 2600 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4720 (Repl. vol. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 65 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240
(1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-36 (1953).
2
1E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1966); CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 352
(West 1954).
2The "Trading with the Enemy Act" § 7, 50 U.S.C. App. § 7 (1970).
z'See Note, Federal Courts-Rule of Civil Procedure-Forum State Statute Denying
Unlicensed Contractor the Right To Sue Requires Dismissal in Diversity Case Even Though
Rule 17(b) Would Allow the Suit, 82 HARV. L. REV. 708, 710 (1969).
24
E.g., VA. CODE ANN. 37.1-139 (Repl. vol. 1970) (incompetents); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-87 to 88 (Repl. vol. 1957) and 8-88.1 (Supp. 1972) (minors).
'See, e.g., Doyle v. Loyd, 45 Cal. App. 2d 493,497, 114 P.2d 398,400 (1941) (infants).
"KENNEDY at 275.
"Scott v. Nance, 202 Va. 355, 117 S.E.2d 279 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-307 (Repl.
vol. 1972), the text of which appears in note 7 supra.
PENAL CODE
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Section 1983 and the Civil Death Statutes
The only cases involving prisoners' capacity to sue under section 1983
decided prior to Almond involved disqualification statutes of the civil
death variety. 8 The leading case is MeCollum v. Mayfield,29 in which the
district court was faced with a section 1983 action brought by a convicted
felon against a sheriff who forced the prisoner awaiting trial to perform
labor in the county jail. The prisoner became ill and was denied proper
medical care, as a result of which he suffered permanent paralysis." A
California statute3 suspended the capacity of all prisoners in state prisons to litigate during their incarceration. The court turned to the literal
wording of section 1983 in resolving the capacity issue: "Section 1983
creates a right of action in 'any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof . .. ' "I2
The McCollum court read the above-quoted language as a sweeping

statement of capacity to sue, relying in part on three earlier district court
decisions which had given the quoted language of section 1983 a broad
interpretation. 3 The McCollum court also based its conclusion on a
Supreme Court decision, Roberts v. United States District Court, 4
which held that the California civil death statute did not prevent a prisoner from seeking permission to proceed in forma pauperis under the
federal statute which provides such relief to "a citizen who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such [court] costs. . . ."5 The Supreme
"SThe theory of the Federal Rules is that capacity to sue or be sued will generally be
presumed. KENNEDY at 284. Thus, Rule 9(a) requires the objector to raise objections to
capacity "by specific negative averment." Since the capacity issue is a threshold defense,
somewhat analogous to lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue, it is waived under
Federal Rule 12(h) (1) if not made in a motion to dismiss before answer or in the answer.
WRIGHT AND MILLER at § 1559. This waiver doctrine would seem to account in part for
the relatively small number of federal court cases in which capacity of a prisoner to sue or
be sued has been discussed.
29130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
30
1d. at 113.
"CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1970). The text of the statute appears in note 53
infra.
31130 F. Supp. at 116. The text of section 1983 appears in note 2 supra.
'In the first case, a district court held that the word "person" in section 1983 was
broad enough to include the Jehovah's Witnesses organization. Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F.
Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946). The other two cases were suits by prisoners under section 1983.
In both, the court held that section 1983 gave prisoners a right of action despite civil death
statutes. Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp.
477 (E.D.IlI. 1948). However, in none of these district courts cases was Rule 17(b) even
mentioned. The capacity question was discussed only briefly as this was not the major issue
in the cases.
1339 U.S. 844 (1950).
'Id. at 845. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1940), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
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Court stated that "[c]itizenship for the purpose of in forma pauperis
proceedings in the federal courts is solely a matter of federal law."'36 The
McCollum court found this reasoning highly persuasive because section
1983 extends a right of action to "any citizen or other person within the
jurisdiction" of the United States, while the statute in Roberts applied

only to "citizens."
However, neither the Supreme Court in its per curiam disposition of
Roberts, nor the McCollum court made any attempt to formulate general

federal standards regarding capacity to replace the certainty provided by
Rule 17(b)'s direction to apply the law of the individual's domicile. Fur-

thermore, the McCollum court failed to explain why it chose to follow
the literal wording of section 1983 but not the literal wording of Rule

17(b).

37

Analysis of the legislative history of section 1983 underscores the

unsoundness of the literal wording approach of the McCollum court. At
the time of the enactment of the federal statute, it was generally held that

prisoners had forfeited all rights.3 s A congressional attempt to change
the established status of prisoners would most probably have been de-

bated at length. However, examination of the hundreds of pages of debate
in the Congressional Globe indicates that Congress was concerned not

with prisoners' rights but with the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and the
39
status of the Negro.
An additional criticism of the McCollum holding can be derived from
a historical overview of the early congressional civil rights statutes. It has

been forcefully argued that the legislation enacted after the Civil War,
of which the predecessor of section 1983 was a part, was meant to alter

drastically the allocation of power between the states and the federal
government." The Supreme Court has apparently adopted this view.4
11339 U.S. at 845.
3The McCollum court merely stated, "[A] literal application of Rule 17(b) to the case
at bar would bring about an artificial and erroneous result. Such a provision cannot be
applied mechanically to every case." 130 F. Supp. at 116.
3'The prevailing attitude towards prisoners at the time of passage of the act was
succinctly stated in Ruflin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871), which
denied application of the Virginia Bill of Rights to felons: "He [the convicted felon] has,
as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except
those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of
the State." This attitude towards prisoners remained prevalent until recent decades. Turner,
supra, note 6 at 473-74; Goldfarb and Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 175, at 183-85 (1970).
"See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 365-827 (1871); Shapo, Constitutional
Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277-82 (1965).
"See, e.g., Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1323 (1952); Note, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Civil Remedy-Its Circumvention and Emascu-
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Thus, it would seem that recognition of an exception to Rule 17(b) for
section 1983 would require recognition of an exception for actions
brought under other provisions of the civil rights laws, absent a showing
that section 1983 is somehow a unique provision of the United States
Code.

Despite these apparent flaws in the McCollum opinion, commentators
have noted that the outcome in the case would appear to be desirable,
arguing that it would be unwise to allow state capacity concepts to inhibit
an individual's ability to seek the protection of federal substantive statutes.42 However, there are important reasons why the McCollum
rationale should not be perpetuated.
A logical deduction from the McCollum holding that section 1983
contains a blanket authorization of capacity is that minors or mental
incompetents have capacity to litigate under that section. Such a decision
would run contrary to the established policy of the law of capacity.43
Moreover, by limiting its justification for an exception to Rule 17(b)
to the finding of a blanket authorization of capacity in section 1983, the
McCollum court created problems for the federal courts which would
face the capacity issue in later cases. Other important federal statutes
may not include the broad "person" language which a court could interpret as a direct authorization of capacity.44 Thus, under McCollum, life
prisoners in states retaining civil death statutes purporting to bar all suits
by such prisoners might find themselves completely deprived of a federal
remedy through the operation of a state statute, unless the federal statutes
on which their claims are based are worded similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Prisoners subject to suspended capacity statutes might be subjected to
long delays in asserting their rights under federal law. Both situations
might pose due process problems, in view of recent Supreme Court decisions stressing the right of access to the courts.45 The McCollum opinion
contains little reasoning which could aid a federal court in avoiding these
undesirable and perhaps unconstitutional results.
This failure of the McCollum court to provide an adequate basis for
lation, 12 How. L.J. 285 (1966). The predecessor of what is now section 1983 was labeled
a bill "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States." H.R. 320, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1871).
"Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
2
" WRIGHT AND MILLER at § 1560.
"Text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
"E.g., 42 U.S.C. 1982 (1970) ("All citizens . . . shall have the same right . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.").
"Note 19 supra.
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its holding created difficulties for both the district court and the Fourth
Circuit in Almond. The two courts disagreed concerning the application
of the McCollum precedent.
Almond v. Kent
The district court in Almond v. Kent based its decision regarding the
applicability of the Virginia committee statutes on the distinction between

formal incapacity and total or suspended capacity." The McCollum line
of cases47 was distinguished because state statutes in those cases prevented

the prisoner from presenting his contentions in any manner, while the
committee statute, although barring the prisoner from personally litigating, allowed his claims to be litigated by the committee. Because the

Virginia statute requires an appropriate court" to appoint such a committee on the motion of any interested party, 9 the district court found the
statute to be a limited procedural obstacle not serious enough to justify
allowing an exception to Rule 17(b).10

The district court in Almond did not discuss the specific argument in
McCollum that section 1983 contains a blanket authorization of capacity.5 Adoption of that position would have required a finding that the

Virginia statute was inapplicable. Instead, the court apparently took a
limited view of the holding of McCollum and the cases following it,
believing that they established an exception to Rule 17(b) which would
only operate when the prisoner was completely deprived of his remedy

under section 1983. Although it did not discuss the issue in depth, the
district court was perhaps concerned with maintaining the integrity of the
literal wording of the Federal Rules.
The Fourth Circuit, however, apparently accepted the McCollum
"6Text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.
47
Despite the shortcomings of the opinion, McCollum was relied on and cited with
explicit approval in Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
845 (1963). Two New York federal district courts have reached different conclusions regarding the applicability of the New York civil death statute to prisoners' suits under the civil
rights statutes. Compare Beyer v. Werner, 299 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) with Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The opinions do not add to the
McCollum discussion.
"The motion must be made in the circuit or corporation court of the county or city in
which any part of the prisoner's estate is located. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-305 (Repl. vol.
1972). If the prisoner has no property or estate in Virginia, the motion must be made in
the county or corporation court having probate jurisdiction in the county or city wherein
the offense was committed. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-306 (Repl. vol. 1972).
"9The statutory phrase "interested party" has not yet been judicially interpreted. However, it is clear that the party opposing the prisoner in the suit is such an "interested party."
Scott v. Nance, 202 Va. 355, 117 S.E.2d 279 (1960).
"0321 F. Supp. at 1227.
"1Text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
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interpretation of section 1983 and put forth two additional reasons for
its finding that the prisoner in Almond had capacity to sue. In relying on
the McCollum line of cases, the Fourth Circuit stated that the district
court's distinction between the civil death statutes and the committee
statute was "tenuous and insubstantial." 2 The only apparent basis for the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion is the fact that the California civil death
statute involved in McCollum allowed administrative officials discretion
to restore a prisoner's rights. 5 From this, the court reasoned that the
California statute could not be considered a complete bar to a prisoner's
suit, just as the Virginia statute was not a total bar to prisoners' suits.
However, the Fourth Circuit did not acknowledge the apparent distinction between a statute requiring mandatory appointment of a committee
on motion of any interested party and a statute barring prisoners' suits
unless penal authorities in their discretion remove the bar. It appears then
that the Fourth Circuit disregarded the formal-total incapacity distinction" which the district court had perceived.55 Rather than attempting to
justify an extension of the section 1983 exception developed in the civil
death cases to those involving formal incapacity statutes, the Fourth
Circuit merely indicated that the McCollum line of cases was highly
persuasive.
The second justification employed by the Fourth Circuit in its decision
was that the underlying rationale of the Virginia statutes did not seem to
involve any state interest that Rule 17(b) was designed to preserve. 6
Noting first that it had never been determined by any court whether
section 53-307 of the 1950 Virginia Code was intended to apply to suits
in a federal court in Virginia, the court went on to point out that the
present Virginia statute was the outgrowth of an earlier statute 7 enacted
to alleviate the consequences of the common law rule which permitted a
person convicted of a felony to be sued but not to appear in court to
defend his case.5" The court thus viewed the statute as enacted for the
5459

F.2d at 202.

PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1970) states, in relevant part:
A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends
all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices
and all private trusts, authority, or power during such imprisonment. But
the Adult Authority may restore to said person during his imprisonment
such civil rights as the authority may deem proper, except the right to act
as a trustee, or hold public office or exercise the privilege of an elector or
give a general power of attorney.

"CAL.

"Text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.
55
Text accompanying note 50 supra.
11459 F.2d at 202.
"7Law of March 14, 1878, ch. 21 § 6-12, 1877-78 Virginia Acts of Assembly 357-58.
11459 F.2d at 202; Merchant's Adm'r v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 82 S.E. 106 (1914).
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prisoner's benefit. This interpretation led the court to conclude that requiring the statute to be observed in section 1983 suits could only jeopardize the prisoner's rights.59
While its conclusion may be appealing, the court overlooked other
possible analyses of the committee statute. The fact that the Virginia
legislature has chosen to reenact 0 the statute may indicate that there are
state interests behind the statute which were not considered by the court.
The retention of the statute may represent a legislative judgment"' that

prisoners are unable to manage their affairs6 2 inasmuch as the powers
given the prisoner's committee are similar to those given the committee

of an insane person. 3 Additionally, the legislature may have believed,
as have other state legislatures, that such statutes are necessary to maintain prison discipline in view of the vexatious litigation which might

otherwise be brought by inmates against prison personnel.64 Rather than

11459 F.2d at 202. It might also be argued, in view of the historical background of the
committee statute, that it was enacted to give felons the opportunity to bring ordinary
contract and tort actions, but that the statute is irrelevant to the question of the capacity
of felons bringing civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Support for this reading of
the Virginia committee statute could be derived from the fact that, at the time of its
adoption, Virginia felons were generally believed to have lost all civil rights, Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871), and thus the committee statute could
not have been directed at suits by prisoners involving such rights. Further support for this
view might be found in the languge of the statute which gives to the committee control of
the prisoner's "estate." Note 7 supra. The Virginia courts, however, have interpreted the
statute so as to be applicable to all civil actions brought by convicted felons, not merely
contract or tort actions. Merchant's Adm'r. v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 82 S.E. 106 (1914). One
exception is a federal habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254-55 (1970).
However, Federal Rule 81(a)(2) provides that the other federal rules are not applicable to
habeas corpus actions except when the federal statute does not prescribe the procedure to
be followed. The federal courts have not read Rule 17(b) into the federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 81:05 (2d ed. 1972).
"The present VA. CODE ANN. § 53-307 (Repl. vol. 1972) was formerly section 4999 of
the Virginia Code of 1919.
"1Cf 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5109 (3d ed. F. Horack 1943).
The vast majority of prisoners who file pleadings are laymen of deprived educational
backgrounds. See Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1968).
'Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-135 to 147 (Repl. vol. 1970) with VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 53-307 (Repl. vol. 1972). This similarity was first acknowledged in Merchant's Adm'r
v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 82 S.E. 106 (1914).
6
Cf Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 845 (1963); see also Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15
BUFFALO L. REV. 397 (1965). In Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964),
the court said many prisoners do not view a civil case as providing "for the redress of
genuine grievances or wrongs, but rather as a blackjack to be used indiscriminately, maliciously, and at will to harass and annoy not only their jailers, but Judges, Jurors, witnesses
and everyone having anything to do with their conviction." Id. at 21.
For the prisoners' view see Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L.
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balancing all of the state interests involved against the federal policies
behind section 1983 and Rule 17(b), the Fourth Circuit apparently chose
only to discuss those interests which were favorable to its view of the
proper result.
The third contention made by the Fourth Circuit in support of its
decision was that the possibility of delay in appointing a committee or
the failure of the committee to institute the suit promptly could result in
complete deprivation of the prisoner's remedy through the bar of the
statute of limitations.15 The court viewed this as a possibility because the
Virginia statute of limitations is not tolled during incarceration, as is the
case in most states which suspend a prisoner's right to sue. 6
However, the statute of limitations problem in Almond could have
been avoided because of the liberal federal court policy on amended
pleadings. 7 The federal courts have allowed amendments substituting a
party plaintiff with proper capacity after the statute of limitations ostensibly barred the suit, relying on the policy that such amendments relate
back to the original filing date of the complaint." Thus, any prisoner who
REV. 343 (1968). For a study of the actual time required to dispose of prisoners' 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 cases in a recent period, see Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV.

1352, 1354 (1970).
1459 F.2d at 202-03.
"Id. at 203; compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-30 (Repl. vol. 1957) limitations suspended
for infants and insane persons only) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83 § 22 (1966) and CAL. CODE
CIV. PRO. § 352 (West 1954).
"Federal Rule 15(c) states:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period
provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be
brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution
of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on
the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.
Although Rule 15(c) does not expressly apply to a new pleading adding or dropping plaintiffs, courts have applied the same notice and identity of interest factors in allowing such
changes. WRIGHT AND MILLER § 1501.
6
"Deupree v. Levinson, 186 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951).
Although there are no reported cases involving the Virginia statute, the federal court rule
is that as long as the defendant is fully apprised of a claim arising from specified conduct
and has prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be
prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke
a statute of limitations defense. WRIGHT AND MILLER at § 1501. Cf Scott v. Nance, 202
Va. 355, 117 S.E.2d 279 (1960), in which the Virginia court allowed a wrongful death action
L.

REV.
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brought suit in his own name before the statutory period of limitations
had run should be allowed to avoid the problem which the court found

significant. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit, in the remainder of its opinion,
determined that a two-year limitation period applied to all section 1983

actions, as opposed to the one year period applied by the district court.69
Two years would seem to be an adequate period within which to have a

committee appointed and file suit. Additionally, the Virginia statutory
scheme provides for relief should the person serving as committee fail to
discharge his duties.70
The Almond decision is a significant extension of the McCollum
holding in that the Fourth Circuit is the first federal court to hold that
prisoners may sue under section 1983 without having to contend with a
formal incapacity statute. 71 However, according to commentators involved in the drafting of the rule, the domicile principle was adopted in
the belief that deference to state policy on capacity would foster uniform-

ity of treatment of individuals 7 and would be easiest for the federal
system to apply.73 The validity of the committee statute would at least

appear to be arguable, 74 and the Fourth Circuit's refusal to apply it would
seem to foster uncertainty as different federal courts may disagree on the

issue.
Suggested Solutions to the Capacity Problem

The federal court system will, in all probability, be called upon to
to be commenced against a released felon after the statute of limitations had apparently
run. The decedent's administrator's earlier suit brought against the incarcerated felon in his
personal capacity had been dismissed.
'1459 F.2d at 204; note 8 supra.
7'VA. CODE ANN. § 53-309 (Repl. vol. 1972) states:
The committee shall render accounts of his trust, and may be made
to account therefor; shall be entitled to compensation for his services, and
may forfeit his right thereto, in the same manner as if he were administrator or guardian.
§ 53-311 states:
If any person, so appointed, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond as
required, the court, on like motion, shall commit the estate to the sheriff
of the county, or sergeant of the corporation, who shall be the committee,
and he and the sureties on his official bond, shall be bound for the faithful
performance of the trust.
7
Text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
7rThus a person who had capacity to sue in his home state could litigate in any federal
court in the United States. Clark and Moore, A New FederalCivil ProcedureIL Parties,
44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1312-13 (1935).
7
PROCEEDINGS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (1939) at 65; 3A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.16 (2d ed. 1970).
7
Text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
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decide an increasing number of capacity questions in the future. One
reason for this trend is the large increase in the amount of litigation being
instituted by prisoners,' who are often the subjects of state statutes purporting to limit their capacity to litigate."
The difficulties encountered by the federal courts with Rule 17(b),
illustrated by the Almond and McCollum cases, would seem to stem from
the failure of the rule to distinguish between capacity of individuals in
federal question cases and diversity cases. Rule 17(b) presently makes
such a distinction only with regard to partnerships and unincorporated
associations, which, if lacking capacity to sue under state law, are granted
capacity to enforce a federal substantive right." The reasons the draftsmen of the rules did not extend this principle to other parties is unclear.
However, it has been noted that Rule 17(b) as presently drafted was the
product of compromise."' One approach to remedying this apparent
shortcoming in the rule is to amend Rule 17(b). A case-by-case
solution involves recognition of a residual power in the federal court
system to grant individuals and other parties independent capacity status
for the protection of rights under federal law, where state law might deny
them qualification to sue.
Support for the proposition that the federal courts may independently
allow capacity to litigate in special situations may be found in the case
law dealing with the capacity of corporations and representatives. Rule
17(b) provides that the capacity of a corporation shall be determined by
the law under which it was organized. This approach is similar to the
treatment of individuals in that a single standard for diversity and federal
question cases is apparently established. However, the Supreme Court
has held that, under the principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 9
7
See
76

Chevigny, supra note 64, at 1352-54.
Notes 18 and 20 supra and the accompanying text.
7
7Rule
17(b) states in full:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative
capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile.
The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by
the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue
or be sue shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district
court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or
be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it
a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the
United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is governed
by Title 28, U.S.C. § 754 and 959(a).
7
13A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.22 (2d ed. 1970).
"'304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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there may be applicable substantive state forum law denying capacity to
a foreign corporation, thus barring the federal suit even though the corporation has capacity by the law under which it was organized." This power
of the forum state to bar a federal court diversity suit, however, apparently does not exist when the claim is based on federal law. 8' For example,
in United States ex rel. Bernadot v. Golden West Construction Co.,8 2 a

contractor corporation had not qualified to do business in Utah and thus
lacked capacity to sue there. When it was sued in a Utah district court
under the Miller Act,13 the corporation was allowed, nevertheless, to
assert a federal law counterclaim. 4
Rule 17(b) provides that the capacity of a representative is to be
determined by the law of the forum state," once again apparently setting
down a single standard for both federal question and diversity cases.
Nevertheless, in suits based upon some federal statutes, judges have disregarded state forum capacity restrictions. For example, Congress in the
Federal Employer's Liability Act 6 created a right that can be sued upon
by the "personal representative" in favor of beneficiaries. When a Pennsylvania domiciliary administratrix of the deceased brought an F.E.L.A.
death action in New York, Judge Learned Hand found that there was no
good reason to impose the restrictions of the forum state precluding an
out-of-state administrator from suing without taking out ancillary letters.
In fact, he asserted, it might be unjust where state law does not allow
taking out ancillary letters." The same fairness theory might be argued
with regard to other federal statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or a court
could use Judge Hand's opinion merely to support the proposition that
the standards set up in Rule 17(b) are flexible rather than absolute.
However, an extensive judicial attempt to modify the first sentence of
Rule 17(b) might be an undesirable approach. Amendment of the rules
has been a favored method of resolving difficulties" which cannot be
easily handled by a judicial policy of liberal rule construction alone.8
"Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).

at 302.
12194 F. Supp. 371 (D. Utah 1961), nmdified, 340 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1962).
-40 U.S.C. 270 (1970). The Miller Act establishes performance and payment bonding
requirements for most federal construction contracts.
"194 F. Supp. at 375. This holding might also be justified by the compulsory counterclaim requirement of Rule 13(a). Id. at 374.
'The text of Rule 17(b) appears in note 77 supra.
"KENNEDY

-45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
4Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 841, 842 (2d Cir. 1946). Contra, Reynolds v.
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
-"Major amendments to the Federal Rules became effective in 1948, 1961, 1963 and
1966.
"Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules "shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."

